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Abstract  
This paper examines the possible effects of corporate governance (GC) on audit quality (AQ) 
among the FTSE 350 companies. Using a sample of 180 companies from 2012 to 2017 (i.e., 
1080 firm-year observations) a binary logistic model has been employed to investigate the CG-
AQ nexus. This analysis was supported by conducting a probit logistic model as a sensitivity 
analysis. Our findings are associative of a heterogeneous impact of CG on AQ post the 
implementation of the 2012 CG reforms in the UK. For example, although institutional 
ownership and management ownership can predict AQ, board independence, non-executive 
directors and audit committee are not attributed to AQ in the UK. This implies that corporate 
compliance with good CG practices has a limited impact on the decision to select a Big4 auditor 
in the UK. Despite the limitations of our study, we hope it can motivate further investigations 
in this area. 
Key Words: Corporate governance, audit quality, auditor selection, FTSE 350, UK. 
 
Introduction 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and audit 
quality (AQ). Our motivation was primarily stemmed from agency theory, i.e., the idea that 
separation of control and ownership in modern businesses can create incentives for managers 
to prioritise their interests rather than shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Given that earnings figures may be used in different ‘‘contracts’’, such as compensation 
agreements, executives have incentives to manipulate their companies’ reported earnings. 
Shareholders, therefore, can employ various devices to constrain such opportunistic behaviour. 
Our study focuses on two of these tools accessible to shareholders to watch management 
behaviour, i.e., the external audit and corporate governance (CG). External auditors are 
apparently independent parties appointed to verify the reliability and accuracy of the financial 
information provided by managers to shareholders (Chen et al., 2005). The audit process, 
nevertheless, does not certainly offer blanket assurance that all types of misstatements and/or 
misclassifications were captured (Jackson et al., 2008). Rather, auditing reports might be of 
variable quality (Hoitash et al., 2007). Audit quality (AQ) can affect the probability that an 
auditor will be able to detect material misstatements (Adams, 1994). This means that AQ is 
attributed to a more significant opportunity to discover any material misstatements. Similarly, 
a high AQ reduces information asymmetry leading to a lower bid-ask spread (Coller and Yohn, 
1997). If a company does not assure a top AQ, this might result in increasing the uncertainty 
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regarding the reported financial information, in that way increasing investment risk which is 
associated with the cost of equity of a firm (Lenz and Hahn, 2015). 
 
In an attempt to restore public confidence in a competitive business environment, Big 4 audit 
firms intervene independently to detect accounting misstatements and frauds, defined as ‘audit 
quality’ by DeAngelo (1981). The International Federation of Accountants (IFACs) and 
International Standards on Auditing (ISA) on professional ethics highlight the importance of 
auditor independence in mind and appearance in accounting estimates. The reason is that 
external auditors are involved routinely with the board of directors and, importantly, with the 
audit committee in the audit process to provide an unqualified view for the users of financial 
statements (Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2017). 
Shareholders, furthermore, have another mechanism by which they can attain a high quality of 
audited information, i.e., the corporate governance process. For example, if shareholders have 
adequate voting stock to be influential, they might be able to apply sufficient force to obtain 
high AQ (Ntim et al., 2012).  
 
The incidence of a series of corporate scandals at the end of the 1980s, such as the bankruptcy 
of the Barings Bank, increased the necessity to reform and enhance CG provisions in the UK 
(Al-Bassam et al., 2016). That period was categorised by poor performance and weak corporate 
disclosure regarding CG systems (Conyon & Mallin, 1997). Accordingly, since the early 
1990s, several pieces of regulations and legislation have been introduced, aiming at restoring 
investors’ confidence by enhancing transparency and accountability of the publicly listed firms 
on London stock exchange (LSE). In May 1991, for example, the LSE and the Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) established the Cadbury Committee, with the aim of improving CG 
practices among UK listed companies (Ntim et al., 2015). Cadbury Report, however, was 
criticised for concentrating mostly on the financial-related aspects of CG and discounting other 
significant features such as risk management and the pay of executive directors (Conyon & 
Sadler, 2010; Ntim et al., 2016). 
 
In 2003, the Smith Report focused on enhancing the performance and function of audit 
committees (Aebi et al., 2012). In 2006 and 2008, the UK Combined CG Code was revised, 
after the 2008 financial crisis, however, it has increased the debate related to the effectiveness 
of CG mechanisms in constraining executives’ opportunistic behaviours and protecting the 




In 2012, the UK Combined CG Code was revised with a specific focus on improving the 
effectiveness and role of institutional shareholders. These reforms have also recommended that 
non-executive directors (NEDs) should make up half of a company board to provide creative 
strategies for companies by providing free oversight and constructive challenges to executive 
directors (FRC, 2016). We have, therefore, been motivated to investigate the possible effects 
of the 2012 CG reforms on AQ in the UK from 2012 to 2017 using an agency theory 
perspective. On the basis of these reforms, we examine the possible effects of a composite of 
five CG internal mechanisms on AQ. These CG mechanisms are the board independence, 
institutional ownership, management ownership, non-executive directors and audit committee. 
Our paper contributes to CG-to-AQ related literature in the UK and around the world that apply 
the “Anglo Saxon” CG system by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the 2012 UK CG 
reforms that would help regulators and policymakers to improve the ‘comply-or-explain’ 
principles that could contribute to good CG practices and high quality of audited financial 
information. 
 
Our results suggest that CG compliance in the UK have, so far, a limited impact on AQ or 
auditor selection. Our evidence is in line with the voluntary nature of CG mechanisms in the 
UK, where listed corporations might not be held accountable for not conforming with a specific 
CG provision if they have offered a reasonable explanation. This implies a crucial need for 
developing such effective enforcement mechanisms for CG provisions in the UK such as 
appending CG reforms, such as the 2012 reforms, to listings rules for listed firms to comply 
with. 
 
The remainder of this paper is designed as follows. First, we briefly discuss previous literature 
and the development of hypotheses. Second, we introduce the research design. Third, we 
present the results of logistic regression, including additional analysis and; finally, we conclude 
our research’s policy and practitioner implications, limitations and future studies. 
    
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
There is a stream of literature that investigated the association between corporate governance 
and audit quality internationally. In our review of CG-AQ studies, we focus on mature markets 
that have been experiencing various governance and financial reporting issues.  
There are various investigations of the CG-AQ nexus in the mature markets such as the US 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2010; Schelker, 2013); the UK (e.g., Zaman et al., 2011; 
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Ghafran and O'Sullivan, 2017); South Korea (e.g., Kwon et al., 2014; Kwon et al., 2018); 
Australia and New Zealand (e.g., Hay et al., 2017). Most of these studies suggest that corporate 
governance mechanisms were, on average, positively and significantly associated with audit 
quality. For example, in their study of the relationship between CG and AQ in the UK, Zaman 
et al. (2011) were suggestive of a significant positive association between CG (proxied by audit 
committee effectiveness) and AQ (proxied by audit fee and non-audit services fee) only in the 
case of large-sized firms.  This implies that larger clients, maybe due to their complexity, 
appeared to be keener in purchasing non-audit services even if they were characterised with 
active audit committees. Similarly, Ghafran and O'Sullivan (2017) examined the possible 
effects of a CG mechanism (proxied by audit committee expertise) on audit quality (proxied 
by audit fees) among a sample of FTSE 350 companies in the UK. Their findings indicate that 
the audit committee with greater financial expertise was attributed to higher audit fees. This 
positive relationship was driven by non-accounting versus accounting expertise among the 
sampled companies. 
Collectively, the results of these studies called for more in-depth analysis for the CG-AQ nexus. 
The recommendations of future directions for CG-to-AQ studies in developed countries might 
help to identify the possible determinants of a sound CG along with better audited financial 
information which believed to promote objectivity and independence and address the agency 
conflict between the principal and agent within a given organisation (Hay et al., 2017; Kwon 
et al., 2018). In a free market, such as the UK, a good CG mechanism is critical where 
government intervention is limited in the business environment. The agency conflict becomes 
the most dominant issue. Interestingly, auditors intervene in the mature markets might be 
regarded as a regulatory agency for the shareholders and the management to provide assurance 
services. These factors provide evidence of the added value of the best CG practices and AQ. 
Our study, therefore, aims at addressing the existing gap in the literature by investigating the 
CG-AQ nexus among a sample of FTSE 350 post the 2012 CG reforms in the UK. 
Board of directors has a significant role in the governance of the ownership separation between 
management and shareholders (Gebrayel et al., 2018). In this regard, Sharma and Kuang (2014) 
conclude that independent non-executive directors (NEDs) are concerned with discipline and 
monitoring the management to ensure there is a good quality of financial reporting. 
Independent NEDs play a critical role in reducing frauds and the misstatement of financial 
information in an organisation. The link between AQ services and the board of directors may 
be formal. In term of management responsibility, NEDs regularly work with management in 
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the selection of external auditors. Since external auditors are charged with the review of 
financial statements, the board has the duty to review the work and scope of the audit planning 
and fees (Alwardat et al., 2015).  
The independent board of directors can influence AQ through their expertise and commitment 
to overseeing the audit work and make sure their expectations do not undermine auditor 
independence (Kwon et al., 2018). If the external auditors understand that the auditee is 
pursuing complex accounting, they have the ultimate duty to challenge the management, 
whether it is in the best interests of the shareholders. Performing AQ services help to avoid or 
jeopardise professional competences. Ghafran and O'Sullivan (2017) found that the existence 
of board independence promotes high AQ, which minimises the agency cost, thus resulting in 
a low audit fee. Based on the above discussion, the following hypothesis was formulated. 
 H1: There is a significant positive relationship between board independence (BI) and 
audit quality (AQ) among the FTSE 350 from 2012 to 2017. 
According to agency theory, the principal-agent relationship is influenced by opportunistic 
behaviour and moral hazard resulting from information asymmetry (Niskanen et al., 2011). 
Ivanova (2017) assumes that institutional ownership (IO) has more power than individual 
shareholders. It is reasonable that IO asks for high AQ services to protect their interests and 
tend to choose Big4 audit firms to pursue high AQ (Bell et al., 2015). In other words, the larger 
the institutional investors, the higher the AQ and the lower the agency cost for the firm. It is 
assumed that the growth of institutional investors creates a demand for AQ services (Bell et 
al., 2015). Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
H2: There is a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
audit quality among a sample of FTSE 350 from 2012 to 2017. 
 
Good CG can only be achieved by the strength of rule and regulation. A company with a robust 
internal control structure requires high AQ, for instance, in internal control mechanisms 
whereby the non-executive directors (NEDs) retain the balance power on behalf of the 
shareholders (Knyazeva et al., 2013). The roles and responsibilities of NEDs are highly 
important in overseeing the financial reporting (Baker et al., 2010); thus preventing the 
manipulation of accounting figures by the management (Spira, 2007). Likewise, governance 
mechanisms can only be achieved through the mechanisms of good control and monitoring 
(Ntim et al., 2012). This implies that the role of NEDs is to make sure that companies’ annual 
reports are prepared in compliance with the UK CG code. The UK Best CG Code (2012) 
recommends that half of the board should be made up of independent NEDs. The presence of 
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NEDs on the board helps to minimise the weaknesses of the board on the committee (Knyazeva 
et al., 2013). In this regard, Ibrahim et al. (2016) argue that the number of NEDs can 
considerably influence the entity’s financial information disclosure. According to the UK 2012 
CG reforms, the balance between the executive board and NEDs tends to reduce both 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest.  
Knyazeva et al. (2013) and Huang and Chan (2013) stated that the contribution of NEDs is 
critical to a firm’s performance where it believed to enhance the audit function. The UK 2012 
CG reforms recommend that the audit committee must be at least three independent NEDs. 
This indicates the significance of NEDs in minimising agency conflicts. An independent NED 
is important in monitoring management behaviour. It seemed to limit the frauds and errors in 
the financial reporting process, improve the financial performance, strengthen the auditor's 
independence, and then, enhance the quality of audited information (Khani and Noroozian, 
2018). Based on the discussion above, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H3: There is a negative and significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
audit quality among a sample of FTSE 350 from 2012 to 2017. 
H4. There is a positive and significant relationship between non-executive directors 
and audit quality among a sample of FTSE 350 from 2012 to 2017. 
Audit Committee (AC) is seen as one of the most effective CG control tools used in Europe 
and the Anglo-Saxon model of CG, the ‘comply-or-explain’ principles (Ibrahim et al., 2016). 
The Cadbury Committee (1992) recommends listed companies to have a minimum of three AC 
members in the monitoring mechanisms. However, if the AC is accountable for the selection 
and the appointment of external auditors, it must ensure that there is an effective appointment 
procedure, internal control, accounting standards and a provision to safeguard the auditor’s 
independence (Verschoor, 2008). Likewise, Verschoor (2008) stated that the involvement of 
an AC reduces the likelihood of fraud, litigation, earnings management and preserves the 
external auditor’s objectivity and independence which consequently reduces the conflict of 
interests and agency costs. As a result, the 2012 CG reforms recommend that all listed 
companies ought to establish an AC of at least three independent NEDs or explain why they 
have not complied. Therefore, the following hypothesis was formulated. 
H5: There is a positive and significant relationship between the audit committee and 





Research design  
 
Data and sample considerations 
The population of this research is based on all financial and non-financial firms listed on LSE, 
with complete data for the years from 2012 to 2017. It has been decided that the sample data 
will be collected from FTSE350 in the UK. The FTSE350 index represents a large number of 
listed firms that comply with UK CG code on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis. The sample contains 
a systematic period of the post-2012 CG reforms in the UK. Consistent with Erkens et al. 
(2012), the data was obtained from the annual reports of 180 out of 350 companies listed in 
FTSE 350 available on the Bloomberg database. Companies in the sample should have 
available annual reports from 2012 to 2017, should be listed in the FTSE 350 index before 
2012 and listings continued up to 2017 in compliance with UK listing rules (FRC, 2016), any 
company in the sample with incomplete annual reports is systematically excluded and, the 
fiscal year should end on 5th April of the year. Our sample, consequently, comprised 1080 
observations (180 company, representing 51.4% of the overall population of listed corporations 
in LSE which is statistically acceptable) over a 6-year period.  
Measures 
Table 1 below explains how the research variables were operationally defined. In examining 
the research hypotheses, we divide our investigation into four stages. First, we measure audit 
quality using a dichotomous process where it takes 1 if the company is audited by a Big4 
auditor and 0 if it is not (Kane and Velury, 2004), and audit tenure as a second proxy for AQ 
where a company coded one if the tenure is 3-6 years, otherwise 0 (Anafiah et al., 2017), and 
finally internal audit as a third proxy for AQ where a company is coded 1 if it has internal 
auditors (Beisland et al., 2015). However, we found no variability in internal auditors and a 
very low degree of variability (less than 3%) regarding using audit tenure as a proxy for AQ. 
We have, therefore, excluded them from our analysis as they have were not statistically 
meaningful. For the reasons mentioned above, we only use the big4 variable as a proxy for 
auditor selection and quality in our study. Second, we use the main proxies for corporate 
governance (CG) internal mechanisms that have been reformed in the 2012 CG reforms in the 
UK which are Board Independent (BI), CEO Duality (CD), Institutional Ownership (IO), 
Management Ownership (MO), and Audit Committee (AC). Third, in an effort to tackle any 
potential existence of endogeneities concerning omitted variables, a set of firm-specific 
characteristics has been used to control for the association between CG and AQ in our study. 
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The selected control variables are the firm size (SZ), business complexity (BC), industry type 
(IT), leverage (LE), and non-survivorship firms (NSF). Due to collinearity issues, nevertheless, 
we have included SZ and LE, only. These controls were chosen to be consistent with prior CG-
to-AQ studies (see Zaman et al., 2011; Nnadi et al., 2017). Additionally, the current paper 
investigates the CG-AQ nexus using a binary logistic regression model to test the key 
hypotheses and a probit logistic regression as a robustness analysis. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                   ---------------------------------------------- 
Analysis 
Consistent with prior CG-to-AQ studies that used a dummy variable as a proxy for AQ (e.g., 
Carey and Simnett, 2006; Premuroso and Bhattacharya, 2008; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Kane and Velury, 2004) the empirical examination is conducted using binary logistic 
regression (Wooldridge, 2010). The binary logistic regression is specified as follows: 
  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼0 +  𝛽𝛽1  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3  𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4  𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6  𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖  𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                       
 
Where AQ is audit quality, BI is board independence; the CD is CEO duality, IO is 
institutional ownership, MO is managerial ownership, NEDs is non-executive directors, 
AC is audit committee. CONTROLS are the firm size (SZ) and leverage (LE). 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the research variables for all 1080 firm-year 
observations. Our results indicate varying degrees of distributional properties in our variables. 
For example, AQ shows a very low degree of variability with an Std. Deviation of 0.388. In 
contrast, IO indicates the second-highest level of variation among the selected research 
variables with an Std. Deviation of 29.13. Similarly, SZ is associated with the highest level of 
variability with 29.68 Std. Deviation. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                   ----------------------------------------------  
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Table 3 presents the frequencies for the dummies. It shows that 18.4% of the sampled firms 
were audited by non-big 4, whereas 81.5% were audited by the big four auditors. Regarding 
CEO duality, 96.6% of the CEO in our sample concurrently holds the position of chairman, 
while 3.4% were not. Likewise, the proportion of independent directors on the Board and NEDs 
varied from 0 to 16 in our sample. Additionally, the size of the AC was varying between 0 and 
7.  
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
                                                   ----------------------------------------------  
Table 4 shows the correlation analysis of the variables of our study. According to the 
coefficients on both Pearson and Spearman correlations any residual non-normally distributed 
variables could be mild and are furthermore similar to those stated by previous studies (e.g., 
Kane and Velury, 2004; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Premuroso and Bhattacharya, 2008). 
Crucially, the magnitude and direction of coefficients on Pearson and Spearman matrices are 
mostly similar, consequently suggesting that any residual non-normalities are unlikely to lead 
to any statistical problems could affect the results of our investigation. 
----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
                                                   ----------------------------------------------  
Logistic Regression Analysis  
The primary hypothesis in our paper predicts that a firm with good CG practices is highly 
expected to have a higher quality of audited financial statements among the FTSE 350 after the 
2012 CG reforms in the UK. In the correlation matrix (refer to Table 4), AQ is indeed positively 
and significantly correlated to board independence (BI), CEO duality (CD), institutional 
ownership (IO), non-executive directors on board (NEDs), audit committee size (AC), whereas 
it was negatively related to managerial ownership (MO).  Nevertheless, once the binary logistic 
regression model was estimated with the other firm-specific characteristics of interest 
controlled, heterogeneous relations were observed (see Table 5 column 1). Remarkably, while 
IO and MO were positively and significantly associated with AQ, the remaining CG 
mechanisms (i.e., BI, CD, NEDs, and AC) cannot predict AQ as measured by big 4 in our 
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sampled companies. This means that using binary logistic regression, H2 has been statistically 
supported, whereas H1, H3, H4, and H5 have been rejected. (Refer to Table 5 column 1). 
In addition to conducting a binary logistic regression, we have carried out a probit logistic 
regression as a robustness analysis. The results of probit regression were consistent with the 
main results of binary logistic regression where the effect of CG internal mechanisms on AQ 
is still heterogeneous in that they might have either increased or decreased the AQ (see Table 
5 column 2). 
Markedly, nevertheless not the key emphasis of our paper, the control variables (firm-specific 
characteristics) have significant influences on AQ.  For example, firm size as measured by total 
assets (TA) is positively and significantly associated with AQ. Similarly, leverage (LE) has a 
positive and significant association with AQ (Refer to Table 5 column 1). 
According to our results, the presence of independent directors is less likely to improve the 
governance standards as a monitoring tool for risk management in the UK, which goes against 
the claim of agency theory. This relationship could indicate that the proportion of inside 
directors reduces the ability of outside directors to contribute to AQ positively. This finding is 
consistent with the results of Gajevszky (2014), in contrast, inconsistent with Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2011) findings that concluded that the independent directors are effectively addressing the 
conflicts of interests. 
The findings also show that most IO in the UK relies on Big 4 audit firms to provide quality 
audit services. Theoretically, the reliance on Big 4 helps to monitor the agent behaviour as 
expressed by agency theory. This implies that IO plays a vital role in the control of listed 
companies after the 2012 CG reforms. In this regard, our findings were in line with the results 
of Husnin et al. (2016) that state that IO is one of the drivers of the selection and the 
appointment of external auditors to provide high-quality financial reports. However, Nnadi et 
al. (2017) opposed our findings by reporting a negative and significant association between IO 
and AQ in Morocco (a developing country) where family-owned businesses rely on local 
auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. Likewise, our results indicate that with important 
shareholdings, MO has a significant impact on the demand for AQ during the period of study. 
Arguably, the divergence of interests is likely, when an agent holds a large proportion of shares, 
to have a greater influence over the company, hence, the greater influence of power to act in 
their own self-interest (Holderness and Sheehan 1991). These agency conflicts raise the 
demand for high AQ, suggesting that Big 4 audit firms provide high AQ as a means to deter 
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MO’s information asymmetry. Our findings are tied to the findings of Francis and Wilson 
(1988) and Adam and Bala (2015) that indicated a positive and significant relationship between 
MO and AQ. 
The results of the present study suggest that NEDs cannot predict AQ, which leads to a question 
of whether NEDs opinions were biased. Furthermore, our results contradict the findings of 
Nnadi et al. (2017) that indicate that NEDs have a significant influence on AQ. Additionally, 
our results report an insignificant association between the AC and AQ, raising doubts that the 
AC attributes do not contribute to CG mechanisms in the provision of a good quality of audited 
accounting information in the UK. Many empirical studies give credibility to our findings; for 
example, Akinteye et al. (2015) and Tanyi and Smith (2014) are indicative of an insignificant 
association between AC and AQ.  Relatedly, Ghafran and O'Sullivan (2017) found a positive 
association between AC expertise and AQ among a sample of FTSE 350 in the UK. 
Conclusions 
In 2012, the UK Combined CG Code was revised with a specific focus on improving the 
effectiveness and role of institutional shareholders and recommended that NEDs ought to be a 
half of a company’s board (FRC, 2016). Given that, we have been inspired to examine the 
expected influences of CG compliance on auditor selection and AQ in the UK from 2012 to 
2017. Our findings are suggestive of heterogeneous effects of CG mechanisms on AQ among 
a sample of FTSE 350. Notably, the institutional and managerial ownerships were both 
positively attributed to AQ, although board independence, non-executive directors, and the 
audit committee cannot predict the quality of audited financial statements in the context of the 
study. This means that institutional and managers owners are more interested in the selection 
of big4 auditors, which is expected to enhance the quality of the auditing quality. This also 
implies that the 2012 UK CG reforms have a limited effect on AQ, so far.  
Given the voluntary nature of the UK CG code “comply-or-explain”, listed firms might not 
essentially hold accountable for not being compliant with a specific CG provision as long as 
they were able to provide a realistic explanation. Our findings have, therefore, some policy and 
practitioner implications are related to the necessity of establishing a sound enforcement 
mechanism by which the 2012 CG reforms can be implementable in the UK.  For instance, 
these reforms might be appended to a comprehensive set of listings rules for publicly listed 
firms to comply with. 
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Regardless of the efforts to confirm the robustness of our findings, several limitations must be 
acknowledged. For example, our sample consisted of data from six years for 180 out of the 
FTSE 350. Likewise, we could have included pre the 2012 CG reforms data. Therefore, we call 
for further studies using a more inclusive set of data associated with a period pre and post the 
2012 CG and the other following reforms to examine the effects of corporate governance 
mechanisms on audit quality in the UK. Additionally, we recommend researchers to examine 
the moderating effects of CG mechanisms on the relationship between AQ, and other types of 
aggressive accounting practices such as earnings management and tax avoidance in the UK and 
those countries are adopting the “comply-or-explain” principles of CG. 
• On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of 
interest.  
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Table 1: The operational definition of the variables of the study. 
VARIABLES DEFINITION MEASUREMENT PREVIOUS 
STUDIES 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
AQ Audit Quality Audit quality is a dependent variable equal to 1. If a 
firm is audited by one of the big4 audit firms such as 
KPMG, PWC and Deloitte equal 1, otherwise 0.  
Kane and Velury 
(2004). 





IA Internal Audit The internal auditor is a proxy of audit quality coded 
to 1 if a company has internal auditors. 
Beisland, Mersland 




The board independence is the proportion of 
independent directors on the Board 
Zaman et al. (2011) 
and Kane and 
Valury (2004) 
CD CEO duality If the chief executive duality is the chairman of the 
company. A dummy variable scores one if the CEO 
concurrently holds the position of chairman, 0 
otherwise. 
Zaman et al. (2011).  
IO Institutional 
Ownership 
Institutional investors are measured by the proportion 
of shares owned to the total issued capital of the firm 




Management ownership is measured by the 
proportion of shares held by corporate officers or 
insiders divided by the number of shares of 
outstanding common stock 
Zaman, Humdaid 
and Hanifa (2011); 




The size of the audit committee is a dummy variable 
coded to 1 to firms having an audit committee, 
otherwise 0 




Company size is based on the natural logarithm of 
total assets 
Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa (2011); 




Business complexity is the number of subsidiaries a 
company owns 
Zaman and Haniffa 
(2011); Nnadi, 
Efobi and Oledinma 
(2017). 
IT Industry Type If a company belong to a financial sector equal to 0, 
otherwise equal to 1. 
Gerged et al. (2018) 
LE Leverage Leverage is measured by the percentage of long-term 
debts divided by total assets 
Kane and Valury 





Non-survivorship firms on the results, a dumpy 
variable created coded to 1 if companies continuously 
present in the sampling period from 2012 to 2017, 
otherwise 0.  
Carcello and Nagy 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AQ 1080 0.82 0.388 0 1 
BI 1080 5.76 2.375 0 16 
CD 1080 0.97 0.182 0 1 
IO 1080 36.07 29.13 0 343.60 
MO 1080 5.03 14.70 0 127.4 
NEDs 1080 6.42 2.587 0 16 
AC 1080 3.72 1.217 0 7 
SZ 1080 63.90 29.68 38.50 269.25 
LE 1080 14.64 33.76 -42.61 96.22 
















Table 3: Frequency for categorical data 
Variables codes Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
AQ 0 199 18.4 18.4 18.4 1 881 81.5 81.6 100 
 Total 1080 99.9 100  
CD 0 37 3.4 3.4 3.4 1 1043 96.5 96.6 100 
 Total 1080 99.9 100  
0 38 3.5 3.5 3.5 
BI 
1 2 0.2 0.2 3.7 
2 12 1.1 1.1 4.8 
3 68 6.3 6.3 11.1 
4 165 15.3 15.3 26.4 
5 260 24.1 24.1 50.5 
6 197 18.2 18.2 68.7 
7 137 12.7 12.7 81.4 
8 71 6.6 6.6 88 
9 56 5.2 5.2 93.1 
10 30 2.8 2.8 95.9 
11 23 2.1 2.1 98.1 
12 13 1.2 1.2 99.3 
13 3 0.3 0.3 99.5 
14 2 0.2 0.2 99.7 
15 1 0.1 0.1 99.8 
16 2 0.2 0.2 100 
  Total 1080 99.9 100   
NEDs 
0 42 3.9 3.9 3.9 
1 2 0.2 0.2 4.1 
2 24 2.2 2.2 6.3 
3 118 10.9 10.9 17.2 
4 229 21.2 21.2 38.4 
5 196 18.1 18.1 56.6 
6 170 15.7 15.7 72.3 
7 100 9.3 9.3 81.6 
8 78 7.2 7.2 88.8 
9 37 3.4 3.4 92.2 
10 35 3.2 3.2 95.5 
11 35 3.2 3.2 98.7 
12 6 0.6 0.6 99.3 
13 4 0.4 0.4 99.6 
14 1 0.1 0.1 99.7 
15 2 0.2 0.2 99.9 
16 1 0.1 0.1 100 
  Total 1080 99.9 100   
AC 
0 39 3.6 3.6 3.6 
1 11 1 1 4.6 
2 427 39.5 39.5 44.2 
3 395 36.5 36.6 80.7 
4 142 13.1 13.1 93.9 
5 40 3.7 3.7 97.6 
6 19 1.8 1.8 99.4 
7 7 0.6 0.6 100 
  Total 1080 99.9 100   




Table 4: Pearson and Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
Per/ Spr AQ BI CD IO MO NEDs AC SZ LE 
AQ 
 .155** .173** .193** -.160** .113** .159** .151** 0.042 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.164 
BI 
.183**  .218** .620** -.465** .740** .467** .626** .226** 
0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CD 
.173** .271**  .091** -.064* .184** .174** .089** .100** 
0.000 0.000  0.003 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.001 
IO 
.090** .575** .077*  -.533** .537** .337** .718** .206** 
0.003 0.000 0.012  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
MO 
-.119** -.168** -.108** -.175**  -.441** -.214** -.565** -.262** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEDs 
.152** .742** .245** .474** -.131**  .384** .622** .210** 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
AC 
.214** .532** .284** .235** -.104** .468**  .233** .064* 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.036 
SZ 
-0.019 .414** 0.038 .614** -.066* .354** .077*  .438** 
0.537 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.012  0.000 
LE 
0.013 0.039 0.007 0.028 -0.006 0.036 -0.003 0.010  
0.665 0.206 0.827 0.353 0.840 0.243 0.920 0.748  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed),*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). The variables have 













Table 5: Results of binary and probit logistic regressions for 1080 firms-year observations 
Variables Binary Logistic Regression Probit Logistic Regression 
 BI -0.015 (0.186) -0.005 (0.379) 
 
CD -0.004 (0.959) -0.020 (0.588) 
IO 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.002 (0.000)*** 
MO 0.002 (0.002)*** 0.001 (0.005)*** 
NEDs -0.014 (0.119) -0.008 (0.088)* 
AC -0.020 (0.130) -0.016 (0.027)** 
SZ 0.005 (0.000)*** 0.002 (0.000)*** 
LE 0.002 (0.044)** 0.001 (0.151) 
Constant -4.495 (0.000) *** -2.559 (0.000)*** 
Note: The primary investigation method in this study is a binary logistic model. The robustness test 
probit logistic model. The variables are entirely defined in Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
